* Re-implement PKI from #1509
co-authored-by: edinnen <ethanjdinnen@protonmail.com>
* Set the key lengnth to actually make PKI work.
* Remove unused variable and initialize keys to null
* move printBytes() to meshUtils
* Don't reset PKI key son reboot unless needed.
* Remove double encryption for PKI messages
* Cleanup encrypt logic
* Add the MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI option, and set it for minimal builds. Required for STM32 targets for now.
* Use SHA-256 for PKI key hashing, and add MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI_KEYGEN for STM32
* Fix a crash when node is null
* Don't send PKI encrypted packets while licensed
* use chIndex 8 for PKI
* Don't be so clever, that you corrupt incoming packets
* Pass on channel 8 for now
* Typo
* Lock keys once non-zero
* We in fact need 2 scratch buffers, to store the encrypted bytes, unencrypted bytes, and decoded protobuf.
* Lighter approach to retaining known key
* Attach the public key to PKI decrypted packets in device memory
* Turn PKI back off for STM32 :(
* Don't just memcp over a protobuf
* Don't PKI encrypt nodeinfo packets
* Add a bit more memory logging around nodeDB
* Use the proper macro to refer to NODENUM_BROADCAST
* Typo fix
* Don't PKI encrypt ROUTING (naks and acks)
* Adds SecurityConfig protobuf
* Add admin messages over PKI
* Disable PKI for the WIO-e5
* Add MINIMUM_SAFE_FREE_HEAP macro and set to safe 1.5k
* Add missed "has_security"
* Add the admin_channel_enabled option
* STM32 again
* add missed configuration.h at the top of files
* Add EXCLUDE_TZ and RTC
* Enable PKI build on STM32 once again
* Attempt 1 at moving PKI to aes-ccm
* Fix buffers for encrypt/decrypt
* Eliminate unused aes variable
* Add debugging lines
* Set hash to 0 for PKI
* Fix debug lines so they don't print pointers.
* logic fix and more debug
* Rather important typo
* Check for short packets before attempting decrypt
* Don't forget to give cryptoEngine the keys!
* Use the right scratch buffer
* Cleanup
* moar cleanups
* Minor hardening
* Remove some in-progress stuff
* Turn PKI back off on STM32
* Return false
* 2.5 protos
* Sync up protos
* Add initial cryptography test vector tests
* re-add MINIMUM_SAFE_FREE_HEAP
* Housekeeping and comment fixes
* Add explanatory comment about weak dh25519 keys
---------
Co-authored-by: Ben Meadors <benmmeadors@gmail.com>
* Guard against timesources from the mesh if we have good time
* Trunk
* Consider phone time in the past 24 hours authoritative as well
* Rename
* GPS can be null
* Declaration
* Remove RemoteHardware
* Explicitly remove GPS
* Exclude GPS earlier for RAK2560
* bug #4184: fix config file loss due to filesystem write errors
* Use SafeFile for atomic file writing (with xor checksum readback)
* Write db.proto last because it could be the largest file on the FS (and less critical)
* Don't keep a tmp file around while writing db.proto (because too big to fit two files in the filesystem)
* generate a new critial fault if we encounter errors writing to flash
either CriticalErrorCode_FLASH_CORRUPTION_RECOVERABLE or CriticalErrorCode_FLASH_CORRUPTION_UNRECOVERABLE
(depending on if the second write attempt worked)
* reformat the filesystem if we detect it is corrupted (then rewrite our config files) (only on nrf52 - not sure
yet if we should bother on ESP32)
* If we have to format the FS, make sure to preserve the oem.proto if it exists
* add logLegacy() so old C code in libs can log via our logging
* move filesList() to a better location (used only in developer builds)
* Reformat with "trunk fmt" to match our coding conventions
* for #4395: don't use .exists() to before attempting file open
If a LFS filesystem is corrupted, .exists() can fail when a mere .open()
attempt would have succeeded. Therefore better to do the .open() in hopes that
we can read the file (in case we need to reformat to fix the FS).
(Seen and confirmed in stress testing)
* for #4395 more fixes, see below for details:
* check for LFS assertion failures during file operations (needs customized lfs_util.h to provide suitable hooks)
* Remove fsCheck() because checking filesystem by writing to it is very high risk, it makes likelyhood that we will
be able to read the config protobufs quite low.
* Update the LFS inside of adafruitnrf52 to 1.7.2 (from their old 1.6.1) to get the following fix:
97d8d5e96a
* use disable_adafruit_usb.py now that we are (temporarily?) using a forked adafruit lib
We need to reach inside the adafruit project and turn off USE_TINYUSB, just doing that
from platformio.ini is no longer sufficient.
Tested on a wio-sdk-wm1110 board (which is the only board that had this problem)
---------
Co-authored-by: Ben Meadors <benmmeadors@gmail.com>
* Update sensor drive and low power features.
* Update ST7789 TFT control logic.
* Update Heltec nRF board low power features.
* Update the GPS UART port pointer
* Address some FIXME comments
These comments have since been addressed by more modern code.
Remove them to reduce the clutter in the codebase.
* Remove 'dumb idea' from SimpleAllocator
4 year old code that was set never to run can probably be safely
deleted.
* Re-implement PKI from #1509
co-authored-by: edinnen <ethanjdinnen@protonmail.com>
* Set the key lengnth to actually make PKI work.
* Remove unused variable and initialize keys to null
* move printBytes() to meshUtils
* Don't reset PKI key son reboot unless needed.
* Remove double encryption for PKI messages
* Cleanup encrypt logic
* Add the MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI option, and set it for minimal builds. Required for STM32 targets for now.
* Use SHA-256 for PKI key hashing, and add MESHTASTIC_EXCLUDE_PKI_KEYGEN for STM32
* Fix a crash when node is null
* Don't send PKI encrypted packets while licensed
* use chIndex 8 for PKI
* Don't be so clever, that you corrupt incoming packets
* Pass on channel 8 for now
* Typo
* Lock keys once non-zero
* We in fact need 2 scratch buffers, to store the encrypted bytes, unencrypted bytes, and decoded protobuf.
* Lighter approach to retaining known key
* Attach the public key to PKI decrypted packets in device memory
* Turn PKI back off for STM32 :(
* Don't just memcp over a protobuf
* Don't PKI encrypt nodeinfo packets
* Add a bit more memory logging around nodeDB
* Use the proper macro to refer to NODENUM_BROADCAST
* Typo fix
* Don't PKI encrypt ROUTING (naks and acks)
* Adds SecurityConfig protobuf
* Add admin messages over PKI
* Disable PKI for the WIO-e5
* Add MINIMUM_SAFE_FREE_HEAP macro and set to safe 1.5k
* Add missed "has_security"
* Add the admin_channel_enabled option
* STM32 again
* add missed configuration.h at the top of files
* Add EXCLUDE_TZ and RTC
* Enable PKI build on STM32 once again
* Attempt 1 at moving PKI to aes-ccm
* Fix buffers for encrypt/decrypt
* Eliminate unused aes variable
* Add debugging lines
* Set hash to 0 for PKI
* Fix debug lines so they don't print pointers.
* logic fix and more debug
* Rather important typo
* Check for short packets before attempting decrypt
* Don't forget to give cryptoEngine the keys!
* Use the right scratch buffer
* Cleanup
* moar cleanups
* Minor hardening
* Remove some in-progress stuff
* Turn PKI back off on STM32
* Return false
* 2.5 protos
* Sync up protos
* Add initial cryptography test vector tests
* re-add MINIMUM_SAFE_FREE_HEAP
* Housekeeping and comment fixes
* Add explanatory comment about weak dh25519 keys
---------
Co-authored-by: Ben Meadors <benmmeadors@gmail.com>
There are no calls to the functions defined in Nimble from this
class. See also older comment on line 8 about the dream to seperate
mesh and bluetooth :)
* Add GPS detection code for Airoha AG3335
Airoha AG3335 is used in Seeed T-1000E Tracker
* Add support for Airoha AG3335
Airoha AG3335 is used in Seeed T-1000E Tracker. This adds
detection code, and code to configure its use.
---------
Co-authored-by: Ben Meadors <benmmeadors@gmail.com>
